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A metaphysical doubt of reality may arise from such a com-
mon human experience as waking from a dream, surrounded 
by fleeting memories of another world that hint at the possibil-
ity of a deeper reality hiding behind waking life itself. Among 
the countless expressions of this experience, the one by Tzu 
(1968, Chapter 2, p. 49), which dates back to the fourth century 
BCE, stands out: “Once Chuang Tzu dreamt he was a butterfly, 
a butterfly flitting and fluttering around, happy with himself, 
and doing as he pleased. He did not know he was Chuang Tzu. 
Suddenly he woke up and there he was, solid and unmistakable 
Chuang Tzu. But he did not know if he was Chuang Tzu who 
had dreamt he was a butterfly, or a butterfly dreaming he was 
Chuang Tzu.”
In Western philosophy, a succinct statement of the case for doubt-
ing reality is found in Discourse on Method by Descartes (1637, IV): 
“When I considered that the very same thoughts (presentations) 
which we experience when awake may also be experienced when 
we are asleep, while there is at that time not one of them true, I 
supposed that all the objects (presentations) that had ever entered 
into my mind when awake, had in them no more truth than the 
illusions of my dreams.” Between Chuang Tzu (or the butterfly that 
dreamed him) and Descartes, it would seem that philosophical 
inquiry has gotten to the bottom of the reality issue, and that no 
stone has remained unturned in the process.
Science, however, keeps expanding its own range of inquiry, 
and each newly added field comes with its share of stones under 
which there lurk implications for, or even answers to, philosophi-
cal questions (and, often enough, new questions). The question of 
A realist is simply one who knows no more recondite reality than 
that which is represented in a true representation.
– Peirce (1868)
Is this the real life? Is this just fantasy?
…
Ooh yeah, ooh yeah
Nothing really matters
Anyone can see
Nothing really matters – nothing really matters to me
– Freddy Mercury/Queen
(Bohemian Rhapsody, 1975)
1 The seeds of doubT
The suspicion that the world is not quite, or maybe even not at 
all, what it seems has a long history of being toyed with by those 
who are predisposed to metaphysical speculation. It also has a long 
history of being roundly rejected by practically minded people – a 
category that includes most off-duty metaphysicians1. The present 
paper is an attempt to understand both the perennial philosophical 
appeal of questioning reality and people’s routine acceptance of 
reality at the face value, by considering metaphysical insights into 
this singularly important aspect of the human condition against 
the background of some recent developments in cognitive and 
computer sciences.
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the nature of experienced reality and its veracity is a case in point: 
along with many others, this question’s import has been irrevocably 
transformed by the realization that a mind is made of computa-
tions, and that these computations construct a virtual reality.
2 The mind as a virTual realiTy machine
Every physical process – that is to say, every process – in the uni-
verse computes something. Indeed, if a ripe apple falling from a 
tree and the planet from which the tree grows did not compute 
their trajectory with respect to each other, they would be at a loss 
as to how fast and which way to move (Edelman, 2008b). While 
this observation implies that minds too are essentially and literally, 
not metaphorically, computational, not every process qualifies as 
a mind.
Succinctly put, a mind is a persistent bundle of computations 
over representations – state-space trajectories that reliably reflect, 
in a counterfactually consistent manner, the dynamics of physical 
processes that are external (that is, only weakly coupled) to the 
system that implements it. The arguments and evidence for this 
understanding of the nature of minds and its implications for cog-
nitive science have been stated elsewhere and shall not be repeated 
here (for details and references to prior work, see Edelman, 2008a).
Whatever external reality a mind is immersed in, it can only access 
it indirectly: “For, since the things the mind contemplates are none 
of them, besides itself, present to the understanding, it is necessary 
that something else, as a sign or representation of the thing it consid-
ers, should be present to it: and these are ideas” (Locke, 1690, Book 
IV, Chapter XXI, p. 4). This hard constraint does not undermine 
the possibility of reliable knowledge of the outside world2. Indeed, 
the discipline of ecological psychology has been steadily adding 
to our understanding of the conditions for faithful representation 
(see, e.g., Shepard, 1984). Moreover, neurally mediated representa-
tions maintained by brains are generically veridical (Edelman, 1998, 
1999). However, as noted most poignantly by Merker (2007), many 
of those representations are also decidedly virtual.
In human vision, for instance, the binocular visual field is syn-
thesized (by a set of sophisticated stereopsis algorithms) from two 
monocular sources of data. My perception of the visual world is 
phenomenally fused or “cyclopean” despite having two disparate 
physical sources. Moreover, the phenomenal focus of my “first 
person perspective” (Metzinger, 2004) is located inside my skull, a 
couple of centimeters behind the bridge of my nose, where it is in 
fact perpetually dark. These simple observations demonstrate not 
only that the world as I see it is virtual, but also that the central 
aspect of my phenomenal self – the “I” that sees the world – is a 
construct.
Philosophical analysis (Metzinger, 2003) and neurobiological 
data (Merker, 2007) extend these insights to encompass the nature 
of the self in general. As Metzinger (2005) puts it, the mind/brain 
functions as a “total flight simulator”: a virtual reality rig that, in 
addition to collecting and processing the information about the 
world that is needed to steer the body, also simulates the pilot – a 
virtual entity that is entrusted with the control of the body for as 
long as it is awake.
Insofar as it is charged with maintaining representations of the 
environment that can be used to support foresight, a person’s mind 
also endeavors to represent other people, as a means of facilitating 
and furthering social interactions (Edelman, 2008a, Chapter 6). 
Depending on how familiar another person is to me, my simulation 
of him or her can be more or less detailed, in some cases affording 
quite accurate predictions concerning what the other person is 
likely to say or do in a given situation. Thus, autonomous agents 
who populate my virtual reality may be quite independent of me 
(in case they are representations of actual other people, living or 
dead) or merely aspects of myself (in case they are simulations that 
I maintain of other people).
Given that both the “experiencer” (the self) and the universe 
that it experiences are virtual constructs, it makes sense to drop 
the distinction between the two. This move, exemplified in 
Western thought by the writings of Mach (1886) and in the East 
by the teachings of Buddhist philosophers such as Vasubandhu 
(Scharfstein, 1998; Siderits, 2007), assigns primacy to the content 
of experience itself. The natural explanatory tool for this purpose 
is, as I already noted above, computation. Although explaining 
experience has been long considered the “hard problem” of phi-
losophy of mind (Chalmers, 1995), computational accounts of 
experience are now being offered in terms of the dynamic pat-
tern of information in certain representational systems (Spivey, 
2006; Tononi, 2008; Fekete and Edelman, 2011). What does a 
computational theory of mind and experience have to say about 
the reality issue?
3 nesTed realiTies
Computation has a curious property that is directly relevant to the 
reality question: it admits multiple equivalent realizations. A given 
computation can be instantiated in different forms or substrates, 
as long as the relevant aspects of their organization are identi-
cal. In other words, computation is an organizational invariant 
(Chalmers, 1994). As a consequence, carrying out a computation 
in some substrate S is indistinguishable from simulating it (that 
is, from performing it in a different substrate S′ that is identical 
to S on a certain level of organization).
Thus, when an S-brain that would compute a mind M (if 
allowed to play out its dynamics) is itself simulated down to the 
appropriate level of detail within S′, the mind M′ that arises as a 
result is indistinguishable from M. In particular, the phenomenal 
experience of being M′ within S′ is the same as that of M within 
S3. To privilege the experience of one instantiation of a mind over 
another is the same as to claim that the trajectories of two can-
nonballs falling side by side are not really the same because one of 
the cannonballs is made of iron and the other of copper.
Consider now the special situation in which one computa-
tional substrate, while being fully capable of simulating a brain 
along with a sufficiently large chunk of its environment, is wholly 
contained within another: S′ ⊂ S. Although the extra chunk of 
environment is necessary (because minds are not confined to 
individual brains; cf. Dretske, 1995; Edelman, 2008a, Chapter 10), 
it does not have to extend to all of S, and so true containment 
2Nor does it imply that all representations are internal in the sense of being confi-
ned to one’s skull (O’Regan and Noë, 2001).
3Thus, a simulated hurricane would feel very real, and indeed can prove fatal, to a 
person who happens to reside in the same simulation.
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and theoretically viable means for an agent to decide whether or 
not it resides in what Bostrom (2003a) calls the “basement reality” 
rather than in a simulation or in someone else’s dream?
4 on The possibiliTy of experimenTal meTaphysics
While probabilistic arguments from first principles regarding 
certain aspects of reality are being widely discussed by cosmolo-
gists and philosophers (see for instance the extensive literature on 
anthropic reasoning and self-locating belief; Bostrom, 2003b), there 
does not seem to be much in the way of systematic inquiry into the 
possibility of observing or actively testing an environment so as to 
yield clues regarding its location in a potential simulation hierarchy. 
One line of work that may eventually prove relevant to the self-
location issue examines interreality – situations in which coupling 
exists between the present consensual reality, which I shall refer 
to as R, and a virtual or simulated reality R
S
 contained within it.
For example, an interreality system in which a physical pendu-
lum within R is coupled to a virtual pendulum within R
S
 behaves, 
not entirely surprisingly, like a real pair of coupled pendulums 
(Gintautas and Hübler, 2007). The dynamics of an interreality 
system can, of course, be much more complex: coupling a person 
to an appropriately engineered virtual environment has even been 
claimed to have therapeutic value in treating post-traumatic stress 
disorder (Riva et al., 2010).
Can these ideas be developed into a method for determining 
whether or not R is contained within some larger simulating reality 
SR? Gintautas and Hübler (2007) show that in a coupled real/virtual 
pendulum system, a parametric manipulation on one side of the 
divide can be felt on the other side, both in the real-to-virtual and 
in the virtual-to-real directions. As one would expect in this sys-
tem, under certain conditions the effect is sharp or, in the standard 
jargon of dynamical systems theory, catastrophic.
This suggests that if our R is imperfectly contained within some 
SR, an event in the latter could in principle manifest itself to us as a 
state-space transition that is (i) catastrophic, and (ii) inexplicable, 
even with the full knowledge of the situation and the physics of 
R – in other words, an apparent miracle4. A symmetrical situation 
is one in which something that happens in R percolates up to SR 
and causes a catastrophic event there. This latter scenario may be 
quite frequent in universes that are poorly engineered in that they 
fail to provide adequate protection from simulated events, which 
makes them susceptible to a system crash5.
Unfortunately, even a confirmed miracle still leaves us with the 
need to distinguish among several possibilities. The miracle may 
be due to (1) a true top-down reality dysfunction, in which infor-
mation seeps from SR into R, (2) a limitation of our knowledge 
of the physics of R, or (3) an imperfection or inconsistency in the 
functioning of R itself. With regard to (3), the common assumption 
that the universe must obey a fixed set of globally consistent and 
is possible. To an observer situated outside S ′, a mind M′ that is 
contained within S′ has less “elbow room.” Would this make any 
difference to M′ itself?
A familiar example of the containment situation is a multi-
tasking computer system, such as my notebook, which can run a 
number of applications in parallel, each inside a dedicated shell, 
all the while interacting with me via a text editor in a separate 
window. One of those applications can be a neuron simulator. Had 
someone taken a sufficiently detailed scan (Sandberg and Bostrom, 
2008) of the brain of René Descartes back around 1640, and were 
my notebook many orders of magnitude faster (so as to simu-
late the temporal dynamics of a brain on a fine enough scale; cf. 
Fekete and Edelman, 2011), I would have been able to obtain that 
philosopher’s running commentary on where I am going with the 
present argument.
Another example of reality containment is a human brain that 
is asleep and dreaming. During sleep, the thalamocortical pathway 
is partially inhibited and activity in several brain areas (notably, 
prefrontal, and primary visual cortices) is reduced, while others 
remain fully active (Hobson et al., 2000; Muzur et al., 2002). The 
resulting functional network, which is anatomically and physi-
ologically fully contained within the network formed by the waking 
brain, has a peculiar dynamics, which apparently has many uses, 
notably in learning and memory consolidation (Karni et al., 1994; 
Dave and Margoliash, 2000; Lee and Wilson, 2002; Stickgold and 
Walker, 2004; Wagner et al., 2004; Stickgold, 2005; Ji and Wilson, 
2007; Peyrache et al., 2009). The phenomenal experience that arises 
from this dynamics is that of the dream self, situated in a dream 
world.
Let us take a moment to appreciate the nature and the full 
extent of the phenomenal (experiential) predicament of an agent 
who doubts the reality of its experience. Traditionally, this doubt 
could only be assuaged through religion. Thus, Descartes pro-
fessed a belief in a benevolent deity as a guarantor of reality being 
true, while his contemporary, the playwright Pedro Calderón de 
la Barca, made the protagonist in La vida es sueño declare that 
even though life may be a dream, one still has to act as if it is real 
in obeying God.
Nowadays, the case for doubt is, if anything, stronger, while 
many formerly popular varieties of belief have devolved into folly. 
On the one hand, the realization that the dynamics of a compu-
tational system determines all of its cognition, including its phe-
nomenal experience (Spivey, 2006; Fekete and Edelman, 2011), 
implies that a brain that is embodied and situated in the world 
will experience the same reality as its simulacrum that is situated 
within a sufficiently faithful virtual copy of the observable universe. 
On the other hand, the realization that a cognitive agent capable 
of phenomenal experience can be simulated by any punk with a 
computer suggests that a belief in a supreme being that would not 
deceive its creatures is a tad too optimistic.
Phenomenology and faith aside, we may still wonder whether 
or not science has a say in this matter, and if yes, whether its les-
sons would differ from those of intuition. After all, we experience 
the sun as revolving around the earth, and it used to be an item 
of religious orthodoxy that it does, yet basing a space exploration 
program on that premise would doom it from the outset (as most 
of us would agree). Is there is a principled, empirically grounded, 
4As per Hume’s Enquiry, “A miracle may be accurately defined, a transgression of 
a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some 
invisible agent.” (Hume, 1748, Book X, Part I)
5In my computer, protection from contained virtual universes is provided by the 
operating system (OS). Under a good OS, an embedded agent’s attempts to overstep 
the bounds of the memory space allocated to it would either fail quietly or cause it 
to be terminated. In a poor OS, the entire system may be compromised. In my R, 
such imperfect OS tend to have names that begin with “W.”
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Patcha and Park, 2007). Chandola et al. (2009) offer a useful survey 
of problems and methods in anomaly detection, although their 
taxonomy is confused8.
Another relevant set of techniques aims at intrusion detection 
in situations in which information is exchanged between multi-
ple agents and the challenge is to find a rogue one that does not 
belong to the network. For example, Li and Joshi (2009) describe 
a method for distributed detection of rogue nodes in an ad hoc 
mobile network, which is based on feeding gossip among nodes 
into a Dempster–Shafer evidence evaluator9.
In an information-exchange network about which one may not 
assume that all bona fide agents have cryptographically verifiable 
identities, intrusion detection cannot be signature-based and thus 
must rely on anomaly detection (Patcha and Park, 2007). Anomaly 
detection is also the only way to stop an ongoing “zero-day” attack 
– one that uses a hitherto unknown method, for which a canned 
defense is by definition unavailable (this situation is analogous to 
an immune system encountering a radically novel antigen).
These last observations highlight the Achilles’ heel of testing 
reality for bizarreness. All statistical methods for anomaly detection 
need a baseline – a stored body of data that captures the regular 
state of affairs to which new data are to be compared. Baseline data, 
in turn, need verification and protection from reality intrusion. It 
would appear that here too computer science comes to the rescue, in 
the form of cryptographic methods for safeguarding data integrity.
6 crypTography To The rescue?
If we assume, as we must, that a process in the “outer” reality SR may 
have access to any part of the contained reality R, then a crypto-
graphic scheme for guarding R must be such that both the encryp-
tion algorithm and the encryption key (used by all but the simplest 
schemes) are tamper-resistant10. Gennaro et al. (2004) consider 
the problem of providing security against an adversary (think of 
Descartes’ evil demon) who is allowed to apply arbitrary compu-
tationally feasible functions to the secret key. They prove that it is 
generally impossible to achieve this type of ATP (algorithmic tamper-
proof) security. Although ATP security does become feasible when 
certain conditions are imposed on the task11, these conditions make 
the solution irrelevant to our problem of reality authentication.
In an intriguing recent development, Armknecht et al. (2009) 
introduced physically unclonable functions (PUFs) – a crypto-
graphic means for implementing a key that maps challenges to 
responses which are highly dependent on the physical properties of 
the device in which the PUF is embedded. For instance, the state of 
immutable principles is pure wishful thinking, rooted in the medie-
val scholastic tradition of imagining a perfect creator. Moreover, the 
possibility of (2) could be exacerbated by intervention from without 
(that is, from SR) that tampers with the observer’s knowledge of 
physics. Thus, for all we know, the above three possibilities are not 
mutually exclusive, which further complicates our predicament.
While convincing miracles are at best exceedingly rare in R, they 
abound in the dream state. Dreaming, as noted earlier, is a kind of 
simulated reality R
S
 that is (imperfectly) contained within R by 
virtue of the particulars of the brain functional architecture and the 
dynamics of sleep. The containment in this case is imperfect in at 
least two senses. First, outside data can seep into a dream, affecting 
its contents, and possibly waking the dreamer up (Coenen, 2010)6. 
Second, events that transpire within a dream sometimes strike the 
dreamer as out of the ordinary or bizarre.
The feeling of bizarreness is a symptom of imperfect reality 
containment (of R
S
 within R) because something can only appear 
extraordinary when compared to the ordinary, and so for a situa-
tion in R
S
 to appear bizarre, some record of the ordinary must be 
retained by R as it “shrinks” to become R
S
, or else seeps in later, 
just as real-time outside data do. Crucially, one would be justified 
in concluding that the present situation is bizarre only if the dif-
ference between it and a baseline (a memory of ordinary reality) is 
statistically significant7. In judging reality, therefore, the mind must 
rely on statistics just as it does in everything else (Edelman, 2008a) 
– an unsurprising finding, given that, as David Hume pointed out, 
“all knowledge resolves itself into probability” (Hume, 1740, Part 
IV, Section I).
5 using sTaTisTics To TesT realiTy
Putting in place and maintaining a model of the statistical structure 
of the world, so as better to predict it, is an overarching compu-
tational task of the brain (Craik, 1943; Ingvar, 1985; Grush, 2004; 
Edelman, 2008a). The need to learn the statistics of the world is 
especially pressing during development, which is when powerful 
computational principles are brought to bear on seeking patterns in 
perceptual data, social cues, and motor behavior (Goldstein et al., 
2010). Among such patterns, the suspected causal ones are par-
ticularly important. A situated cognitive system, whether or not it 
is itself endowed with a sense of agency, would do well to discern 
other agents at work. Causal inference (Gopnik et al., 2004) thus 
plays a key role in cognitive development.
In statistical testing of reality, causal inference may take the 
form of anomaly or outlier detection – a task that is intensively 
studied in computer science because of its many applications, for 
instance in credit card fraud, network intrusion detection, system 
fault diagnosis, and health monitoring (Hodge and Austin, 2004; 
6The dreamer’s curious metaphysical predicament in such cases has been expressed 
by Ludwig Wittgenstein, in a passage written 2 days before his death on April 29, 
1951: “I cannot seriously suppose that I am at this moment dreaming. Someone 
who, dreaming, says ‘I am dreaming’, even if he speaks audibly in doing so, is no 
more right than if he said in his dream ‘it is raining’, while it was in fact raining. 
Even if his dream were actually connected with the noise of the rain.” (Wittgenstein, 
1972, p. 90e)
7We must remember that a faulty decision device may raise the bizarreness flag 
when in fact there is nothing out of the ordinary. Furthermore, it may be subverted 
into doing so by an intervention from the containing reality.
8Chandola et al. (2009) distinguish among classification, nearest-neighbor, cluste-
ring, generative, information-theoretic (Kolmogorov), and spectral (dimensionali-
ty reduction) approaches, of which only the generative methods they call “statisti-
cal.” They also classify anomalies as point, contextual, and collective.
9The Dempster–Shafer approach differs from Bayesian inference in that probability 
is replaced by an uncertainty interval bounded by belief and plausibility.
10They do not have to be absolutely tamper-proof, if a high probability of success 
suffices and can be guaranteed. Relaxing the requirements in this manner often 
leads to tractable solutions to hard problems in computer science.
11They show that security in this model can be achieved if and only if the system 
has: (1) a self-destructing capability, and (2) a publicly available hardwired data 
from a separate server that cannot be tampered with. However, ATP security against 
an adversary limited to differential fault analysis (flipping random bits) is possible 
without (1) and (2).
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impossibility of upgrading the universe without the requisite tam-
pering being noticed from within it offers an intriguing explanation 
for the rather poor shape that it is in.
8 likely objecTions
The foregoing analysis of the doubter’s predicament depends criti-
cally on the applicability of the concept of simulation to computa-
tional systems capable of having experiences – that is, to minds13. As 
Fekete and Edelman (2011) argue, experience must be an intrinsic 
property of a system’s dynamics – one that does not require inter-
pretation from without and is thus not merely a matter of choosing 
a particular description for the system in question. The notion of a 
simulated mind would thus seem to be self-contradictory, insofar as 
what really matters is the intrinsic dynamics of the simulator (say, my 
laptop’s electrical circuits), rather than the dynamics of the virtual 
brain that it computes. This objection becomes especially poignant 
if the simulator is digital (that is, if its intrinsic dynamics is discrete).
I believe that this concern dissipates with the observation that 
a complex system may possess multiscale intrinsic dynamics (Bar-
Yam, 2004; Shalizi, 2005; Halley and Winkler, 2008; cf. Edelman, 
2008b, Section 5, How a continuous state space gets its spots). In 
such a system, different scales constitute distinct inherent levels 
of operation (rather than merely levels of external description). 
Accordingly, a simulated phenomenal mind can emerge on a certain 
level of a properly engineered multiscale system, whose lower levels 
would remain devoid of experience.
Having noted that, one still wonders whether or not a digital 
computer can be properly engineered so as to simulate a mind. To 
put things into perspective here, observe that a digital computer is a 
discrete dynamical system that is itself simulated by a continuous-
voltage electronic circuit, in which the current is carried by discrete 
entities, whose quantum-mechanical properties (some discrete, oth-
ers continuous) may or may not matter, depending on the implemen-
tation details. If it is indeed possible to simulate a mind in a digital 
system, intervening in it would be computationally more feasible than 
in an analog simulation (e.g., by suspending time and computing the 
requisite next state “offline”). This and other interesting issues will be 
treated elsewhere (Fekete and Edelman, in preparation).
9 some consequences
The present exploration of the reality question leads to four con-
clusions. The first two complement each other nicely, but seem 
to amount to little progress relative to the starting point of our 
discussion:
•	 Epistemological Ceiling. The incapacity in principle of ruling 
out pervasive clandestine reality tampering implies that an 
agent can never tell for sure whether or not its reality is funda-
mental (in Bostrom’s terminology, “basement”).
•	 Phenomenal Indifference. The incapacity in principle of dis-
tinguishing “real” from “simulated” phenomenal experience 
implies that subjectively it does not matter – in both cases, the 
agent feels the same.
a static random-access memory (SRAM) upon power-up appears 
random to an outside observer but is in fact closely determined 
by the physical details of the device that implements the SRAM.
More to the point for biological agents such as myself, there is 
certainly enough idiosyncrasy in the dynamics of the human brain 
to support PUF-based cross-verification of some of the mind’s 
processes by others. It may be that this computational mecha-
nism for self-authentication is behind the perceived continuity 
of the self across periods of temporary self-alteration (sleep) or 
even near self-dissolution (deep anesthesia, the cognitive recov-
ery from which is typically complicated and prolonged relative 
to waking up).
For a PUF to be useful for reality authentication, however, the 
adversary must not be allowed access to the innards of the physical 
device that implements it – a condition that, alas, cannot be taken 
for granted12. At the very least, though, the use of PUFs raises the 
ante in the reality game: the supreme being from SR would have 
to tamper either with the dynamics of a very complex system such 
as an entire brain, or with the fundamental physical laws of R, to 
effect even a simple intervention such as flipping one memory bit 
inside the mind of a PUF-using agent in R.
7 change we can believe in
The potentially staggering computational complexity of mak-
ing a change in a simulated reality that would go unnoticed by 
its denizens has implications for our predicament. The issue 
here is not merely a high computational cost of a clandestine 
intervention but rather its very feasibility: as it is well known in 
computer science, certain problems – those whose complexity 
grows exponentially with the relevant measure of problem “size” 
(say, the number of neurons in a brain that is to be prevented 
from noticing that it is being tampered with) – are essentially 
intractable (Garey and Johnson, 1979). This suggests that a per-
ceived inexplicable change in, or bizarre quality of, one’s reality 
R should be treated as a potentially revealing clue to its true 
nature, simply because either falsifying or masking such clues 
would be so hard.
Even if an agent within R is not cryptographically protected by 
a PUF from any but the most determined and pervasive tamper-
ing coming from SR, there is another reason for it to trust a per-
ceived change: the computational complexity of truth maintenance. 
Specifically, it may be too costly or infeasible to track down all the 
beliefs (entries in a database) that need to be modified if one of 
them happens to change (this is known as the Frame Problem in AI 
and in epistemology; McCarthy and Hayes, 1969; Shanahan, 2009).
Suppose that the SR-agent in charge of the simulation of R 
is less than omnipotent, in that it lacks the resources needed for 
clandestine intervention. Suppose, further, that it wishes to avoid 
being discovered from within R. Its only recourse in this case is to 
launch the simulation of R and then to leave it alone. The theologi-
cal repercussions of this essentially computational argument (e.g., 
parallels to the Gnostic idea of a demiourgos, or a flawed creator; 
cf. Waldstein and Wisse, 1995) are mostly beyond the scope of the 
present paper. I cannot refrain from remarking, however, that the 
12This indicates that the idea of personal “totems” for testing reality, which figures 
prominently in Christopher Nolan’s 2010 film Inception, is not workable.
13I am indebted to T. Fekete for pointing this out to me in a private communication. 
Egan’s (1994) novel Permutation City is a highly entertaining informal introduction 
to a host of related concerns.
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a smart agent should know better than taking too seriously any 
piece of experience or knowledge, including its own enlighten-
ment15. Of course, the very same principles also imply that the 
agent’s mind can be secretly tampered with, in which case it may 
feel smart, enlightened, and in touch with the deepest level of 
existence, all the while remaining a puppet of a game designer 
from a higher reality.
posTscripT
As pointed out by a reviewer, content externalism, as expressed 
for instance in Davidson’s (2001) triangulation argument, would 
seem to rule out the possibility of the kind of sweeping metaphysi-
cal doubt of reality that this paper ultimately refuses to repudiate. 
According to Davidson, objectivity (and hence doubt) requires two 
creatures to create a “baseline” of truth against which an object, 
as the third vertex of the “triangle,” can be evaluated. When com-
bined with a standard brain-in-a-vat scenario, this notion arguably 
renders metaphysical doubt from within the vat, as it were, less 
than fully coherent.
Now, Davidson’s argument can in turn be argued with (see, 
e.g., Bridges, 2006, or Glüer-Pagin, 2006, who writes, “Any ‘norm’ 
for truth and mistake determining these in relation to the reac-
tions of fellow creatures would seem to determine them regard-
less of the actual presence or absence of those fellows”). We need 
not, however, engage in that debate here. Even if one accepts 
the triangulation argument at face value, it has little bearing on 
the metaphysical doubt entertained by a creature that suspects, 
not that it is in reality a solitary brain-in-a-vat, but rather that 
it, along with all of its fellows, is wholly contained in a strictly 
larger reality.
By Davidson’s criterion, this doubt is coherent within the 
contained world, because it can be meaningfully shared among 
the creatures that populate it. Indeed, as the introduction to 
this paper clearly states, I did not invent the doubt: I inherited 
it from the community. I might add that I do not see how I can 
rule out the possibility that some members of that community, 
such as the reviewer in question, are virtual fronts for the game 
designer, who is using them to thwart the publication of this 
paper (perhaps because by drawing the attention of creatures 
like myself to their predicament, it interferes with the game’s 
goals).
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In comparison, the second two conclusions, which ensue when 
certain computational facts (regarding what is feasible in the way 
of information manipulation) are combined with certain meta-
physical assumptions (regarding the possible motivations of beings 
that are capable of simulating entire realities), do have practical 
repercussions:
•	 Credible Change. It makes sense to treat statistically signifi-
cant perceived bizarreness of certain aspects of reality as evi-
dence for it being manipulated, perhaps as a part of a broader 
simulation.
•	 Ontological Indifference. The absence of reliable evidence to 
this effect indicates either that the present reality is fundamen-
tal or that the agent that started off its simulation has subse-
quently withdrawn from intervening in it – two alternatives 
that for all practical purposes are one and the same.
Of the latter two conclusions, the Credible Change principle is 
clearly at work when a dreamer’s realization of the bizarreness of 
the dream causes its disruption, such as waking up, or the onset 
of lucidity, which is a conscious realization of being in a dream 
(LaBerge, 1990).
In estimating bizarreness, care must be taken not to err on 
the side of sounding a false alarm: after all, waking life is at times 
stranger than a dream14. Everett Ruess, a young artist who in 1934 
disappeared in the canyons of the Escalante River in the Utah wil-
derness (a surreal place, if there ever was any), wrote in one of his 
last letters home: “Often as I wander, there are dream-like tinges 
when life seems impossibly strange and unreal. I think it is, too, 
except that most people have so dulled their senses that they do not 
realize it.” In the face of this predicament, and in the light of the 
principles listed above, the rational course of action would seem 
to be to take reality at the face value, and to cast doubt aside, just 
as Descartes did, for reasons of his own.
There is, of course, a venerable school of thought – the doctrine 
set in motion by the Buddha, or the Awakened One – that preaches 
the realization of unreality. Insofar as each mind’s phenomenal 
world, and indeed the mind itself, is virtual in the cognitive-sci-
entific sense (and therefore could be said to have no independent, 
unconditioned nature, or svabha¯va), the s´u¯nyata¯ or emptiness pos-
tulate of Maha¯ya¯na Buddhism (Siderits, 2007, Chapter 9) happens 
to be literally true, as noted by Metzinger (2003; cf. Edelman, 2008a, 
Chapter 9). This, however, only shows that the emptiness principle 
is (somewhat paradoxically) the least consequential of the aspects of 
reality that can be profitably pondered. In the present paper, I tried 
to identify some of the more interesting questions to think about, 
and perhaps to broaden the discussion so as to draw on scientific 
methods in addition to metaphysical speculation.
What I believe I should offer in concluding this discussion is a 
word of caution for anyone who would forgo a thorough under-
standing of the nature of reality in favor of a Zen-like insight into 
it. The Phenomenal Indifference and the Epistemological Ceiling 
principles, each rooted in a different variety of fundamental inca-
pacity, conspire to pull the rug from under any such insight. Thus, 
14Richard Linklater’s film Waking Life makes this case very convincingly.
15Cf. the following passage, referred to as Buddha’s Zen: “I discern the highest con-
ception of emancipation as a golden brocade in a dream, and view the holy path 
of the illuminated ones as flowers appearing in one’s eyes.” (Reps, 1989, pp. 86–87)
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